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Abstract  
What determines the foreign policy approach of a state? Which indicators influence the 
foreign policy, and which can bring about change? In this thesis case-study research, the 
question ‘in what ways a state’s national role conceptions and the attitudes of a state’s leader 
influence foreign policy change in international decision making’ will tried to be answered. 
The indicators ‘interest/experience’, ‘task orientation’, ‘regional/national-oriented’, ‘status-
oriented’, and ‘cooperation-oriented’ are used to help answering the question. There will be 
looked at Brazil’s voting behavior in the General Assembly on four different human rights 
resolutions on North Korea and Myanmar, between 2006 and 2010. There will be examined  
if Brazil’s shift from voting in favor of the resolutions, to abstaining from voting, portrays a 
bigger openness to foreign policy change.  
Four of the five hypotheses have been verified, whilst ‘cooperation-oriented’ stays indecisive. 
In relation with the research question, not an evident question could be given on a theoretical 
level. The direct link between the two variables ‘national role conceptions’ and ‘leadership 
styles’ and foreign policy change is not completely clear. With regard to the hypotheses 
however, more insight was gained on the indicators and drivers that affected the Brazilian 
foreign policy.   
 
Introduction and problem statement  
Alliances among nation states can emerge, disappear, strengthen or weaken over time. In the 
last century the world was characterized for decades by alliances between countries consisting 
of two different blocs; the liberal West and the communist East. With the dissolution of the 
Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War in the 1990s, a shift occurred within the world 
politics (Flemes, 2009: 162). Waves of development and democratization flowed through the 
international system. States took in different positions and alliances changed. In the last 
decade, it seems there is more of a divide between the North and the South, than between the 
East and the West. Developing countries have joined forces and established more and more 
transnational networks and institutions, such as the BRICS-group and the G20 of developing 
nations (Flemes, 2009: 163). The world is becoming increasingly more interdependent, which 
has a lot of consequences for nation states (UN Press).  
             This is also the case for Brazil. In recent years Brazil has deepened and strengthened 
its South-South relations (Milani, 2015: 78). Within these new South-South alliances, such as 
the India/Brazil/South-Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, Brazil claims to make human rights 
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priority on the international agenda (Jordaan, 2015: 463). However, it seems that this 
combination of new alliances and the priority of human rights is conflicting. It can be argued 
that Brazil’s approach to human rights slightly changed in the recent years. Within the United 
Nations General Assembly, Brazil’s voting behavior on human rights resolutions can be seen 
as questionable, as they abstain more and even vote against resolutions. On the resolutions on 
the human rights situations in North-Korea and Myanmar, Brazil voted in favor during the 
2006/2007 vote, but abstained from voting during the 2009/2010 vote (UN Press).  
What has caused this change in voting behavior? Can there be spoken of actual foreign policy 
change or is Brazil merely showing inconsistent behavior? Or maybe Brazil is only executing 
verbal foreign policy change instead of practical change?  
             This case in particular raises other questions. Why do states act the way they do in 
international decision-making? What are the indicators that influence the decision-making 
process? Are a state’s national role conceptions a driver that affect foreign policy? Or does a 
state’s leader leaves the biggest mark on the foreign policy output?  
These questions have led to the formulation of the research question that will tried to be 
answered in this research project:  
Research question  
In what ways do a state’s national role conceptions and the attitudes of a state’s leader 
influence foreign policy change in international decision making? 
In order to answer this question there will be looked into theories on national role conceptions 
(e.g. Holsti, 1970), theories about leadership styles (e.g. Kaarbo, 1997), and theories and 
models on foreign policy change (e.g. Gustavsson, 1999). There will also be looked into 
literature directly concerning the case.  
             The goal of this research is to contribute to the academic debate on how a state’s 
foreign policy is influenced by certain indicators. This project seeks to find more insights on 
how national role conceptions and leadership styles can affect foreign policy change in 
international decision-making. It tries to explain the behavior of states in a world that is 
increasingly interdependent, and how this interdependency between states could be an 
incentive to openness to foreign policy change. This subject is relevant, as the growing 
interdependency between states has a great influence on the international decision-making 
process. Furthermore, the behavior of states in international decision-making can be 
inconsistent, and there needs to be further researched what the possible reasons for this are. 
Why do states behave the way they do in international decision-making? With this research as 
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contribution to the existing theories, I hope to enhance and expand the knowledge and insights 
on this matter. 
             In the next section the existing literature on foreign policy change, national role 
conceptions, and leadership styles will be discussed. Subsequently, the theories, models and 
concepts that will be used for the framework to solve the research question will be examined. 
Hereafter there will be closely looked into the Brazilian case and an empirical analysis will be 
conducted.  
  
Literature review   
Foreign policy change is a domain of foreign policy analysis (FPA) which contributed a vast 
amount of literature to the field (Hudson, 2005:16). Many scholars, such as Hermann (1990), 
Kleistra and Mayer (2001), Gustavsson (1998), and Goldmann (2014), have designed models 
to help explain foreign policy change. Gustavsson’s (1998;1999) study can be used as the 
basis for this thesis. He has executed an extended research on the foreign policy change of 
Sweden concerning the European Union. This case itself is not really relevant for this research 
project, but Gustavsson sets out a broad theoretical framework for understanding foreign 
policy change. Not only does he presents his own model, he also elaborates on the other 
foreign policy change models. He argues that these foreign policy change models can be 
divided into three categories: ‘checklist models, structural constraint models and cyclical 
models’ (Gustavsson, 1998: 18).  
             The type of model I will be focusing most on is the checklist model. The checklist 
model contains a number of independent variables, which can influence the decision making 
process, and present different outcomes on foreign policy change (Gustavsson, 1998: 19). The 
reason I will be using this model is because the type of foreign policy outcome is not the main 
focus point of this research, the variables that cause foreign policy change are. This model is 
also useful when it is unsure which indicator is more important than the others. Derived from 
the literature, indicators that can influence the decision-making process on foreign policy are 
national role conceptions and leadership styles.  
             The pioneer of the theory on national role conceptions is K.J. Holsti. He developed a 
theoretical framework in his 1970s’ study on ‘National role conceptions in the study of 
Foreign Policy’, in order to help analyze foreign policy. ‘Role theory’, mostly developed in 
sociology and psychology,  contributed to scholars’ understanding of the behavior of 
individuals (Cantir & Kaarbo, 2012: 6). Holsti sought to find out how states took on certain 
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roles and behaved likewise, in the international system. Holsti (1970: 246) argues that ‘a 
national role conception includes the policymakers’ own definitions of the general kinds of 
decisions, commitments, rules and actions suitable to their state, and of the functions, if any, 
their state should perform on a continuing basis in the international system or in subordinate 
regional system’. So, he argues that policymakers will formulate their state’s foreign policy in 
accordance with these ruling role conceptions. Not only can a state formulate these national 
roles for itself, they can also emerge from the external environment, being imposed by the 
other states (Holsti, 1970: 240). For example, other states can expect the state to take on a 
certain role within the international system. Holsti (1970: 255) mentions nine types of roles 
that are based on previous literature, and he then formulates his own seventeen different 
categories.  However, it is important to keep in mind that Holsti’s study was conducted in 
1970, a time when the Cold War was evident in the international political system. For this 
reason, there also needs to be looked into more recent literature on national role conceptions. 
Abramson, Chafetz and Grillot (1996), whilst researching nuclear nonproliferation,  have 
taken Holsti’s framework and translated it to more suitable role types for the Post-Cold War 
era. Examples of their role types are: regional leader, global system leader, and global system 
collaborator (Abramson, Chafetz & Grillot, 1996: 734).   
            Another critical remark that can be made on Holsti’s study is, according to Cantir and 
Kaarbo, that his theory on national role conceptions is not always sufficient.  They claim that 
there can be contested roles among elites, and contested roles between the elites and the 
public, which influence the national roles and the state’s foreign policy behavior (Cantir & 
Kaarbo, 2012: 5). Even though there are scholars that criticize Holsti’s study, it is still useful 
for this research as it sets out a broad theoretical framework for understanding a state’s 
national role conceptions.   
             Furthermore, another factor that might enable foreign policy change is the variable 
‘leadership styles’. A state’s leader has influence on the decision making process, and can put 
his mark on foreign policy (Hermann, 1980). For this reason there needs to be looked into 
different kinds of leadership styles, and how they might stimulate foreign policy change. 
Margareth Hermann’s study from 1980 on foreign policy behavior and leadership 
characteristics is a pivotal study on this research topic. Whilst a lot of previous research on 
leadership styles focused on structural factors, Margareth’s study really centers on personal 
characteristics (Kaarbo, 1997: 557). She defines four types of personal characteristics: a 
leader’s beliefs, motives, decision style, and interpersonal style (Hermann, 1980: 9). She then 
formulates two different kinds of leadership styles and orientations: aggressive versus 
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conciliatory. Aggressive leaders, she argues, are keen on nationalism and independence, and 
are suspicious of other nations. Conciliatory leaders are likely to maintain friendly 
relationships with other nations, are less suspicious, and less focused on nationalism 
(Hermann, 1980: 12). This is however, quite a strong dichotomy. It can be argued that it is not 
always possible to define leaders into one of these two categories. Furthermore, there can be 
an overlap between the two dimensions in the foreign policy behavior of leaders. For 
example, a leader can act ‘aggressive’ concerning defense policy, but ‘conciliatory’ 
concerning economic policy. 
             Besides Margareth Hermann’s study, there has been an extensive amount of research 
done on leadership characteristics. The literature has put forward a lot of different variables 
on leadership styles that can vary in importance in certain situations. Besides studies on 
presidents, such as Hermann’s, there are also studies on the leadership styles of prime-
ministers. One of these studies is Juliet Kaarbo’s framework from 1997. As there are 
similarities in a president’s and a prime-minister’s functions, there are also differences. Due to 
this fact, the variables between the two can differ. Kaarbo (1997) however, argues that prime 
ministers and presidents can in fact be compared with each other. She claims that they both 
have ‘some control over the foreign policy making process and over final decisions, and thus 
their individual differences can, at times, matter’ (Kaarbo, 1997: 558). Also, Kaarbo’s study is 
really extensive, as she mentions previous studies on presidential leadership characteristics. 
For this reason Kaarbo’s study can be used as starting point for this research to understand the 
ways leadership styles can influence foreign policy in international decision-making. Kaarbo 
argues that there are five different indicators that can influence foreign policy. An important 
factor is that with these indicators she sets up hypotheses and questions that can be used 
empirically to research the different indicators (Kaarbo, 1997: 570). Kaarbo’s focus on the 
empirical aspect of the research is also a reason to use her framework.  
             There is an extensive amount of literature on national role conceptions and leadership 
styles. The articles that really cover the core and will be used for the basis of this research are 
Holsti’s and Abramson’s, Chafetz’s and Grillot’s frameworks on national role conceptions, 
and Kaarbo’s framework on leadership styles. However, there is also a gap in the literature. 
The literature does not put forward a model in which both national role conceptions ánd 
leadership styles are portrayed to influence foreign policy change. For this reason, I have 
developed my own model, which will be further discussed in the next section.  
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Theoretical framework 
Concerning the foreign policy models, there will looked into the indicators that can influence 
foreign policy change. There will be a focus on in what ways these independent variables 
enable foreign policy change. The independent variables that will be examined in this case are 
national role conceptions and leadership characteristics. The possible relationships between 
the variables are shown in Figure 1. The model is based on Kaarbo’s framework. It is also an 
extension of her framework, as the variable ‘national role conceptions’ is added to the model. 
Both variables need to be taken into consideration to understand in what ways foreign policy 
is influenced in international decision-making.  
             The indicators from Figure 1, in addition with multiple hypotheses and practical 
questions are put forward in Table 1. This table will be the theoretical framework for this  
research. 
 
Figure 1. Relations between the variables.  
Variables  Indicators         Decision outcome               Foreign policy output 
 
Regional/national  
oriented 
National  Status-oriented    
role 
conceptions  Cooperation-oriented  
             Decision -   Openness to  
             making process   foreign 
          policy change  
Leadership  Interest/experience      
styles    
                                       Task orientation 
  
 
The factor ‘decision-making process’ entails in this research the international organization in 
which the decision-making process occurs. I have chosen the General Assembly to function as 
decision-making arena. The General Assembly is the main representative body of the United 
Nations, in which all member states are represented (UN.org). During its meetings, it 
represents the views of a state, on a particular subject, in a specific time period. For this 
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reason, it can function as a reflection of a state’s foreign policy approach.  
             The theoretical frameworks of Margareth Hermann (1980) and Kaarbo (1997) on 
leadership styles are already briefly mentioned in the literature review, but their assumptions, 
variables and hypotheses will now be discussed more in depth. Aspects of both Hermann’s 
and Kaarbo’s theoretical frameworks will be used to help understand how leadership styles 
are able to influence the decision making process and lead to possible foreign policy changes. 
Kaarbo’s assumptions will be adopted in this research. According to Kaarbo (1997: 554) the 
‘primary mechanism for leaders to affect foreign policy is through the decision making 
process’. She focuses on five personal characteristics  for leadership, based on Margareth 
Hermann’s and Preston’s framework. These indicators are: ‘interest and experience in foreign 
policy, task orientation, strategy for managing conflict, strategy for managing information, 
and strategy for dealing with party relations’ (Kaarbo, 1997: 570). For leadership styles, the 
two indicators that will be focused on in this research are ‘interest/experience’ and ‘task 
orientation’. ‘Interest/experience’, entails the present or previous interest and experience of a 
leader concerning a particular issue area (Kaarbo, 1997: 564). For example, there can be 
examined if the leader was already familiar with the foreign policy area, and if he expanded 
his interest on the matter. The second component is ‘task orientation’. The motivation of a 
leader can be reflected in the leader’s task orientations (Kaarbo, 1997: 564). A leader’s task 
orientation depends on whether the leader is focused on the policy goal, or whether he is 
focused on interpersonal or political relations (Kaarbo, 1997: 565). For example, some leaders 
will focus more on personal loyalty and relationships with others, whilst some are more 
procedural – and policy-orientated (Kaarbo, 1997: 565). There can be examined if the leader 
holds particular relationships with other ministers or other state’s leaders, or if he is more 
focused on the policies in general.    
            These leadership style indicators can influence the decision-making process, the 
decision making outcomes, and the foreign policy output (Kaarbo, 1997: 572). The decision 
making process is directly affected by the leadership styles, the decision outcomes to a lesser 
extent, and the foreign policy output more indirect than direct. Kaarbo (1997) formulates 
multiple hypotheses on the relations between the indicators and the foreign policy decision-
making process, outcomes, and output. For example, she claims that when a leader is 
interested and experienced in the foreign policy area, he would be less hesitated to make 
decisions on his own, decisions are more likely to be made with high commitment, the area of 
foreign policy would be more considered in isolation, and there is a likelihood of change 
(Kaarbo, 1997: 564). From this it follows: 
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H1: ‘The more a leader is interested/experienced in the foreign policy area, the more likely it 
is that decisions are characterized by high commitment and the more likely he will be open to 
foreign policy changes that meet the interests of the leader.’ 
Furthermore, Kaarbo (1997: 565) argues that ‘a leader, when coming to politics, may want to 
promote a particular cause’. As mentioned before, a leader can be oriented towards the policy 
goals, or towards interpersonal and political relations. If the leader wants to promote one of 
these task orientations, it is more likely he will try to adapt his foreign policy approach more 
to this. From this it follows: 
H2: ‘The more a leader is committed to certain interpersonal or political relations, the more 
likely he is to adapt his foreign policy approaches to these relations.’ 
The second independent variable that will be looked into is ‘national role 
conceptions’. As mentioned in the literature review, Holsti defines national role conceptions 
as consisting of policymaker’s attitudes towards the certain role the state should play, the 
policies based on these perceptions, and how the state should act in concordance with this. I 
will be using this definition for the rest of this research. One of the main assumptions of 
Holsti’s study is that ‘foreign policy attitudes, decision and actions will be congruent with 
policy makers’ national role conceptions’ (Holsti, 1970: 298). I agree with this assumption 
and will be using it for the rest of this research.  
             The national role performance of a state is ‘the general foreign policy behavior of 
governments, including patterns of attitudes, decisions, responses, functions and commitments 
towards other states’ (Holsti, 1970: 245). These role perceptions and the nation status are, as 
discussed in the literature review, formulated by the state’s policymakers, and by the role 
prescriptions other states project on the state (Holsti, 1970: 245). The national role 
conceptions that are interesting for the behavior of states in the area of human rights are: 
‘regional leader’, ‘example’, and ‘global subsystem collaborator’ (Abramson, Chafetz & 
Grillot, 1996: 734). These three are selected because they each are very different and they 
embody a broad spectrum of different state behavior. A regional leader ‘provides leadership 
in delimited geographic or functional area’, an example state ‘promotes prestige and influence 
by domestic or international policies’, and a global subsystem collaborator ‘undertakes far-
reaching commitments to cooperate with other states to support the emerging global order 
(Abramson, Chafetz & Grillot, 1996: 734). These role conceptions are translated into the 
following indicators. For regional leader this will be ‘region-oriented’ and ‘national-oriented’, 
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for an example state ‘status-oriented’, and for global system collaborator ‘cooperation-
oriented’.  
             A regional leader acts upon the commitment and responsibilities it perceives towards 
states in the particular region the state is identifying with (Holsti, 1970: 261). From this it 
follows: 
H3: ‘The more a state is region-oriented, the more likely a state will be open to national 
foreign policy changes that meet the needs of the region, then when a state is more national-
oriented.’  
An example state is status-oriented. It is likely to act upon and emphasize ‘the importance of 
promoting prestige and gaining influence in the international system by pursuing certain 
domestic policies’ (Holsti, 1970: 268). From this it follows:  
H4: ‘The more a state is status-oriented, the more likely it will be open to national foreign 
policy changes that stimulate national and international prestige and influence.’ 
A global system collaborator is cooperation-oriented and will ‘undertake far-reaching 
commitments to cooperate with other states’ (Abramson, Chafetz & Grillot, 1996: 734). From 
this it follows:  
H5: ‘The more is state is cooperation-oriented, the more likely it will be open to national 
foreign policy changes that strengthen the cooperation and relationships with other states .’ 
Leadership style can influence the foreign policy output and bring about foreign policy 
change (Kaarbo, 1997: 564). National role conceptions as well, influence the foreign policy 
output (Holsti, 1970: 306). I argue that both these variables can affect the foreign policy, and 
influence the openness to foreign policy change, and for this reason I created my own model. 
An important thing to keep in mind however, is that openness to change is not equal to actual 
change in the foreign policy output. A state might be more open to change, but does not 
necessarily actually have to change its foreign policy output. For instance, a state’s leader can 
express he might be more open to foreign policy change, but does not have to act upon it. This 
can be an example of verbal foreign policy change. 
           The table below is a summary from all mentioned above. This framework will be used 
to conduct the empirical analysis. It is based on Kaarbo’s framework on leadership styles. I 
added the variable national role conceptions and the hypotheses in the model. 
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Table 1. Indicators, hypotheses and questions on Leadership Styles and National Role Conceptions 
Indicators  Hypotheses      Practical questions 
       
Interest/  H1: ‘The more a leader is interested/experienced  How many foreign travels  
experience in the foreign policy area, the more likely it is that   did the leader carry out?  
  decisions are characterized by high commitment and  Did the leader develop a  
  the more likely he will be open to foreign policy changes proactive strategy concerning 
  that meet the interests of the leader.’   Foreign policy?  
         Did centralization of power of  
         foreign policy organizations   
                                                                                                                                occur? 
Task  H2: ‘The more a leader is committed to certain inter-  Does the leader focus on the  
orientation personal or political relations, the more likely he will policy goals or on interpersonal  
  adapt his foreign policy approaches to these relations.’ Or political relations? 
 
Regional- H3: ‘The more a state is region-oriented, the more likely  Does the state provide leadership 
oriented  it will be open to national foreign policy changes that in regional area? 
  meet the needs of the region, then when a state is more Is the state more region – 
  national-oriented.’     or national-oriented? 
Status- H4: ‘The more a state is status-oriented, the more likely Does the state promote prestige  
it will be open to national foreign policy changes that and influence by domestic or  
stimulate national and international prestige and influence.’ International policies? 
Cooperation- H5: ‘The more a state is cooperation-oriented, the  Does the state undertake far- 
oriented  more likely it will be open to national foreign policy  reaching commitments to  
  changes that strengthen the relationships with certain cooperate with other states to  
                            other states.’                                                                               Support emerging global order? 
 
 
Research method 
In this thesis case-study research, a single case study will be used. Little research has been 
done on how, within international decision making, both national role conceptions and 
leadership styles affect foreign policy change. I have chosen to use a qualitative approach and 
a single case study, because I want to gain more insight and knowledge on a specific matter, 
with help of the model I designed. A single case study is best applicable for this kind of 
research.  
oriented 
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             The case that will be examined is Brazil’s voting behavior towards four human rights 
resolutions within the United Nations General Assembly between 2006 and 2010. There will 
be looked if Brazil has become more open to foreign policy change, and perhaps changed its 
foreign policy output. Brazil is suitable for this research as it is a relatively large country, and 
not isolated from the international stage. It is also mentioned in the literature that Brazil has 
experienced changing national role conceptions and leadership within the last few years. It is 
interesting to research if Brazil experienced a different approach towards foreign policy. 
Furthermore, Brazil can function as an example for other developing countries that are 
redefining their position and their foreign policy, forming new alliances, and dealing with an 
increasing interdependency towards other states. There needs to be more insight in why states, 
like Brazil, behave the way they do in this case. The General Assembly is suitable for this 
research as international organization, because it represents the views of a state on a particular 
subject, in a specific time period. For this reason it can function as an example of a state’s 
foreign policy approach at that given time. It is also a very important organization concerning 
international decision-making, as it is one of the six main organs of the United Nations and it 
represents all member states (UN.org).           
             The data selected to answer the research question, consist mainly out of journal 
articles. Approximately half of the journal articles on Brazil are written by Latin-American 
scholars, or scholars specialized in Brazil. The rest is written by European International 
Relations scholars. The resolutions that will be looked into are A/RES/61/174 and 
A/RES/64/175 on the situation of human rights in North-Korea and A/RES/61/232 and 
A/RES/64/238 on the situation of human rights in Myanmar (UN Press, 2014). The 
resolutions were discussed during the 61
st
 and 64
th
 sessions of the United Nations General 
Assembly, in 2006/2007 and 2009/2010 (UN Press, 2014).  
             These resolutions have been selected because they represent two moments of time 
during Lula’s presidency. The first two were handled in the General Assembly at the 
beginning of his second term, and the last two at the end of his second term. The cases of 
North Korea and Myanmar are chosen because they both show very serious and severe human 
rights violations. Even though human rights were heavily violated in both countries, Brazil 
decided to abstain from voting anyway during the 64
th
 session. Both states have strategic 
relevance with some of Brazil’s new alliances, such as Russia and China (Milani, 2015: 80).  
These two moments of time are also chosen, because the interrelationships among Brazil’s 
new strategic partners, had strengthened during that time span. At the beginning of Lula’s 
term, little meetings and talks had taken place, whilst at the end of his term a lot of 
14 
 
international summits had been organized between the countries (Jordaan, 2015: 463). 
  
Empirical analysis  
During Lula’s time as president, Brazil’s voting behavior has stayed relatively constant on the 
resolutions on specific human rights cases (Jordaan, 2015: 466). However, the resolutions on 
North-Korea and Myanmar show some discontinuities:  
 
Table 2 
Session/  Country and topics     Vote in General Assembly (GA)  
year 
61
st  2006/ Myanmar: Systematic violations of human rights and Brazil voted in favor of  
2007            fundamental freedoms. Continuing use of torture, deaths the resolution.  
                            in custody, political arrests, continuing imprisonment, 
  recruitments of child soldiers, use of landmines, forced 
  labor, denial of freedom of assembly, association,  
  expression and movement.  
  The GA calls upon the government to end human rights  
  violations, military operations targeting civilians in ethnic 
  areas, recruitment of child soldiers and forced  
  displacements.    
  North Korea: Systematic human rights violations.  Brazil  voted in favor of   
  Including torture, malnutrition, severe restrictions on  the resolution.  
  freedoms of thought, conscience, religion, opinion and  
  movement. 
                            The GA expresses its serious concerns about these 
  violations, urges the government to respect all human 
  rights and give full access of the country to UN human 
                            rights bodies. 
64
th
 2009/ Myanmar: the content of the resolution is comparable Brazil abstained from voting  
2010  to content 61
st
 session.     on the resolution. 
North Korea: the content of the resolution is comparable  Brazil abstained from voting  
to content 61
st
 session.     on the resolution.  
Sources: Milani, C.R.S. (2015). http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/pdf/10.1080/02589346.2015.1005793. 
UN Meetings Coverage and Press Releases. http://www.research.un.org.  
 
Is Brazil merely showing inconsistent behavior, or is Brazil more open to foreign policy 
change? How can this behavior of Brazil be explained? With help of the indicators, questions 
and hypotheses set up in the theoretical framework, this question will tried to be answered.  
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Interest/experience  
First, it was hypothesized that the more a leader is interested/experienced in the foreign policy 
area, the more likely it is that decisions are characterized by high commitment and there is a 
bigger openness to foreign policy change.   
             The leader in this particular case, Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva, was president of Brazil 
between 2003 and 2010, during all moments of voting (Engstrom, 2012: 835). Unlike other 
Brazilian presidents, Lula had little education. He was a steelworker who became involved in 
trade and worker’s unions, and was elected president of the Steel Workers Union. In 1980 he 
was one of the founding members of the ‘Partido dos Trabalhadores’ (PT), the Brazilian 
worker’s party. Before he got elected as president in 2003, he had already run for office three 
times before. In 1986 he was elected as a congressman for PT (Aldé, 2016). Due to his 
previous occupations as union leader and congressman, Lula had gained overall leadership’s 
experience.  
             The literature suggest that during his presidency,  Lula was particularly interested in 
the foreign policy area. Brazilian foreign policy became increasingly active under his rule 
(Engstrom, 2012: 835). Furthermore, according to Cason and Power (2009: 128), who 
researched the Brazilian ‘presidentialization, pluralization, and the rollback of the Itamaraty’, 
Lula had a ‘strong preference for foreign travel’. Lula made much more use of presidential 
diplomacy than his predecessors. During his first term he had already left the presidency 60 
times, spending 159 days abroad and visiting 48 countries in total. The researchers argue that 
this is a very high amount. Lula’s predecessor, Cardoso, left Brazil 92 times during his two 
terms as president. During that time this was seen as extremely high, as his two predecessor 
only left Brazil approximately 7 times a year. Lula’s foreign travels accelerated during his 
second term, making him to surpass Cardoso’s foreign travels easily  (Cason & Power, 2009: 
122). 
             Did Lula develop a proactive strategy towards foreign policy? In almost all of the 
literature on Brazil is mentioned that Lula is focused on a specific policy area, emphasizing 
his strong commitment to the strengthening of South-South relations. Examples of these 
relations are the India/Brazil/South-Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum, and the G20 of 
developing countries (Flemes, 2009: 163). According to Ferdinand (2014: 378), a British, 
International Relations scholar,  Brazil ‘wanted a greater role for the developing world, 
overcoming the feeling of exclusion it has been experiencing’. By expressing his commitment 
to South-South relations, Lula developed a proactive strategy towards foreign policy.  
             Did centralization of power concerning foreign policy organizations occur? Cason 
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and Power (2009) , two scholars of Latin-American studies, researched the role of the 
president and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Itamaraty. They argue that the role of the 
Itamaraty declined due to processes of presidentialization and pluralization. The Itamaraty 
lost its monopoly on foreign and trade policy, and presidents are no longer highly dependent 
on the ministry. Foreign policy was mainly directed by the Itamaraty, but the president has 
taken over this leading role. The Brazilian president got a bigger role concerning the foreign 
policy decision-making process. For this reason, Lula was able to put foreign policy matters 
to his own agenda (Flemes, 2009: 167). Kaarbo (1997) argued, that the more a leader is 
interested/experienced in foreign policy, the more likely it is that decisions are characterized 
by high commitment. As Lula was less dependent on the Itamaraty, he was able to put this 
high commitment more into practice.  
             Lula’s interest and experience in foreign policy is shown by his extensive amount of 
foreign travels, his proactive strategy development towards South-South relations, and his 
influence on the decision-making process due to centralization of power. In relation to H1 
there is the strong indication that due to Lula’s high interest/experience towards foreign 
policy, decisions are more likely to be made with high commitment, and it is more likely that 
Lula will be open to foreign policy changes that meet his interests. For this reason, H1 can in 
this case be verified. 
Task orientation  
Second, it was hypothesized that the more a leader is committed to certain interpersonal or 
political relations, the more likely he is to adapt his foreign policy approaches to these 
relations. To which tasks is Lula oriented? Is he particularly focused on policy goals, or does 
he put more of an emphasis on interpersonal or political relations? 
             Cason and Power (2009: 129) researched Lula’s foreign travels and found that he 
visited more states in Africa, Asia and the Middle-East, than states in the ‘West’. Lula himself 
declared that he is focused on the strengthening of South-South relations (Cason & Power, 
2009: 122).  According to the Brazilian, International Studies scholar Milani (2015: 78), in 
recent years, Lula has made new, strategic alliances. Most of these new organizational 
initiatives are with developing countries, such as the G20 (Flemes, 2009: 163). Furthermore, 
Brazil has also become a part of some extremely strategic organizational partnerships. An 
example is the BRICS-group, an initiative consisting of five rising national economies: Brazil, 
Russia, India, China, and South-Africa (Jordaan, 2015: 463). Another example is the India, 
Brazil, South-Africa (IBSA) Dialogue Forum. The IBSA-Dialogue Forum is ‘a plurilateral 
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group, fostering partnerships among the three countries, and articulating a collective voice in 
international politics’ (Nayyar, 2016: 586). Both organizations are initiatives to promote 
cooperation among developing countries, with a particular focus on economic cooperation. 
The countries that participate in these initiatives are new economic world powers. They have 
been classified as ‘second world countries’ by the ‘first world’. By organizing together in this 
new forum the BRICS-group, they are showing they just as well belong to the ‘first world’ 
(Nayyar, 2016: 575). They are rising countries with booming economies. This participation of 
Brazil can be seen as a clear task orientation of Lula. He has put his commitment to these 
South-South relations also into action. In 2006 Brazil hosted the first summit of the IBSA 
Dialogue Forum, and in 2009 Brazil took part in the first official meeting between the BRICs-
group states (Jordaan, 2015: 463). Brazil’s hosting of the first IBSA-summit is another 
example of Lula’s proactive strategy towards foreign policy. These new alliances are showing 
a substantial change of approach to Brazil’s foreign policy, shifting to a higher commitment to 
South-South relations.       
             Lula’s focus on political relations is made clear by Brazil’s organizational initiatives 
to strengthen South-South relations. Furthermore, Lula has an interest in interpersonal 
relations. The research of Cason & Power on Lula’s presidential diplomacy showed that 
during his first term as president ‘of the 263 presidential participations in diplomacy, in 90 
cases Lula met with another head of state or government’, which is a great amount compared 
to Cardoso, who participated way less in presidential diplomacy (Cason & Power, 2009: 124). 
This shows Lula’s commitment to maintain interpersonal relations with other leaders.  
             Lula was highly committed to interpersonal and political relations. Brazil took part in 
multiple initiatives and organizations to promote South-South cooperation. Especially Brazil’s 
partaking in the BRICS-group was of enormous influence for Brazil’s position in the 
international system. In regard to the hypothesis, Lula’s commitment to interpersonal and 
political relations with his new strategic alliances, represents a clear task orientation of Lula. 
For this reason, I argue that H2 can be verified.  
Regional/national-oriented 
Third, it was hypothesized that when a state is more regional-oriented, it will be more likely 
to be open to national foreign policy changes that meet the needs of the region, than when a 
state is national-oriented. Is Brazil region-oriented and does it provide leadership in the 
region? 
             At the time Lula became president, Brazil was regarded as ‘a passive player in the 
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region, focusing on national interest’ (Flemes, 2009: 167). However, this began to change 
when Lula came to power. Daniel Flemes, a German scholar specialized in Latin-America 
studies, mentions a quote from Lula where he shows his commitment to the region. After Lula 
was inaugurated he stated that ‘a stable and prosperous South-America was a priority goal of 
his foreign policy’ (Flemes, 2009: 167). The fact that Lula mentioned this during his 
inauguration speech, makes it an enormously important starting point for his policy approach 
and his leadership.   
             Engstorm (2012: 841), a lecturer at London Institute of the Americas, argues that 
within South-America, Brazil can be seen as an ‘ambivalent regional leader’. Brazil is an 
active player and takes on leading roles in multiple regional organizations, such as the 
common trade union MERCOSUR, and the South-American Union UNASUR (Flemes, 
2009). In 2008, by initiative of Lula, the South American Defense Council was created 
(Flemes, 2009: 168). So, not only does Lula say he wants an prosperous South-America, he 
also put his words into action. This initiative of Lula is another example of his proactive 
strategy towards foreign policy. Furthermore, Flemes (2009: 168) argues that Lula changed 
his foreign policy approach ‘from trade and economy driven policies to more political or 
strategic focus aimed to the construction of a regional power base’. This again points out 
Lula’s political, strategic, and regional focus.  
 Lula has put his words into action, actively working on a ‘stable and prosperous 
South-America’. Brazil’s involvement within multiple regional organizations indicates its role 
as regional leader. In relation with H3, there is a clear indication that Brazil is region-oriented. 
For this reason, H3 can be verified.   
Status-oriented 
Fourth, it was hypothesized that the more a state is status-oriented, the more likely it will be 
open to foreign policy changes that stimulate national and international prestige and influence. 
Does Brazil promote prestige and influence by domestic or international policies? 
             Brazil is a rising power (Engstrom, 2012: 835). Although it is a developing country, it 
is an emerging power within the global order. By portraying the role of regional leader in 
South-America, Brazil has magnified its status and influence in the international system. 
When Lula became president, the standard foreign policy of Brazil was oriented towards 
Western alliances (Jordaan, 2015: 477). Brazil had strong relationships with the developed 
nations, especially the United States (Flemes, 2009: 167). During Lula’s presidency, this 
shifted to a bigger focus on South-South relations.  Lula wanted to gain more international 
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prestige by participating in new strategic alliances with leading states in the international 
system, such as Russia and China (Milani, 2015: 80).  The most important example of these 
alliances is the BRICs-group. The BRICS-group was defined as ‘compromising the most 
important emerging markets’ by Goldman Sachs in 2001, and countries in the BRICS-group 
are ‘functioning as leading representatives of the developing world’ (Ferdinand, 2014: 377). 
As only the top rising economies joined these organizations, Brazil already gained more status 
just being a part of them. 
             Furthermore, Lula tried to gain more influence by trying to advocate for reform of 
global institutions and norms (Engstrom, 2012: 837). For instance, Brazil took on a leading 
role during the negotiations of the Doha round talks of the World Trade Organization, 
representing the developing countries (Engstrom, 2012: 838). It mainly targeted the United 
States. Brazil argued that most tariffs and subsidies were unfair, and only benefited the 
developed countries (WTO, 2014). Furthermore, Brazil advocated for reform of the United 
Nations Security Council. Lula’s administration argued that the five permanent members did 
not properly represent the current global order, and were advocating for a permanent seat of 
Brazil in the Security Council (Engstrom, 2012: 838). A way of advocating by Brazil was its 
more ‘activist diplomacy towards Africa, and to lesser extent the Middle East’ (Engstrom, 
2012: 839). Brazil also tried to advocate the matter within the region, but did not receive the 
support it wanted. Argentina, Brazil’s biggest concurrent in the region, did not support the 
permanent seat proposal (Engstrom, 2012: 846). Although Brazil’s efforts did not lead to a 
reform of the Security Council, and it did not gain a permanent seat, this strongly advocating 
of a seat in the Security Council indicates to be a change in foreign policy, as Brazil 
intensified its diplomacy towards certain countries and regions. 
             There are strong indicators that Brazil’s new orientation towards these ‘status-giving’ 
initiatives is showing a different approach towards its foreign policy. The incentives for Brazil 
to gain more international influence and prestige have led it to play a more active role on the 
international stage. Brazil is a member of some highly influential organizations, such as the 
BRICS-group, and is also functioning as an advocate for institutional reforms. Thereafter, it 
can be argued that Brazil is more open to foreign policy changes that stimulate its 
international prestige and influence, and for this reason, H4 can be verified.  
Cooperation-oriented 
Fifth, it was hypothesized that when a state is cooperation-oriented, it is likely it will be more 
open to foreign policy changes that strengthen the relationships with certain other states. Does 
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Brazil take far-reaching commitments to cooperate with other states to support the emerging 
global order? 
             As mentioned before, Brazil has broadened and strengthened its South-South 
relationships. It has formed new strategic alliances, and became a part of more organizational 
initiatives. Some important examples are Brazil’s participations in the BRICS-group, with 
Russia, India, China and South- Africa, and the IBSA Dialogue Forum, with India and South-
Africa. There a strong indicators that the bond between these states has strengthened between 
the two moments of voting in the General Assembly. At the beginning of Lula’s second term 
these alliances were relatively new and fresh. At the end of Lula’s second term, Brazil 
attended more international summits, meetings and consultations of these organizations. 
There are strong indicators that over time, the interests of these states became more and more 
intertwined (Ferdinand, 2014: 383). 
             The indicator ‘cooperation-oriented’ shows quite some overlap with the other 
indicators, so not everything will be discussed in detail again. Furthermore, not enough 
evidence was found on the orientation towards cooperation of Brazil. For this reason, H5 
stays indecisive.  
 
Conclusion 
The aim of this research project was to find the answers to the question in what ways a state’s 
national role conceptions and leadership styles influence foreign policy change. There has 
been looked into how the indicators ‘interest/experience’, ‘task orientation’, 
‘regional/national-oriented’, status-oriented’, and ‘cooperation-oriented’ can function as a 
stimulus for openness to foreign policy change.  
             In regard to the research question, my research falls short in order to give an evident 
answer to the question. The direct link between the two variables ‘national role conceptions’ 
and ‘leadership styles’ and foreign policy change is not completely clear. There can be 
speculated on how these two variables enable foreign policy change, but on theoretical level, 
not enough evidence was found on how these variables directly influence foreign policy 
change. There might be another factor of influence that I did not incorporate in my model. 
Both national role conceptions and leadership styles have some influence on the decision-
making process and can affect foreign policy change, but the model I designed is too 
simplistic to explain these complicated relations. The research question did not offer the 
opportunity to clarify more on the existing theories.  
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  In regard to the literature on national role conceptions and leadership styles, 
some of the findings are in line with what I had expected, although I did expect to find more 
primary sources on the matter. The openness to foreign policy change was much more 
difficult to research than I had thought of beforehand. On the theoretical level, the case chosen 
does not explain the research question enough. However, this research did gain more insight 
on the hypotheses and the particular cases. All of the hypotheses have been verified, with the 
exception of ‘cooperation-oriented’, which stays indecisive. President Lula had a strong 
interest in the foreign policy area, with a clear task orientation towards the forming of 
strategic alliances, enhancing the stability and prosperity in the region, and earning more 
international prestige and influence. There are strong indicators that Brazil, due to its 
interdependency to its new allies, has decided to change its voting behavior from voting in 
favor, to abstaining from voting. On both the resolutions of Myanmar and North Korea, China 
and Russia voted against the resolutions. It can be argued that it is in Lula’s interest to keep 
Russia and China as close allies, and this was a strong incentive to change its voting behavior 
from voting in favor, to abstaining. However, it is not possible to say if Brazil’s decision to 
change its voting behavior on the resolutions in the General Assembly on Myanmar and North 
Korea is actually an active change of its foreign policy output, verbal foreign policy change, 
or merely inconsistent behavior. 
Discussion 
This research project functions as a contribution to the academic debate on theories on 
national role conceptions, leadership styles and foreign policy change. It tries to expand the 
knowledge on how different factors and indicators can affect foreign policy change. 
             Although this research project contributed to the condition of the academic debate on 
foreign policy change, there are some limitations, in theoretical view. The literature did not 
put forward a model that I could use to answer the research question. For this reason, I 
designed my own model. This model however, lacks the complexity needed to solve the 
research puzzle. For instance, I have incorporated the variable ‘decision-making process’ in 
my model, but I did not look into this process. I took this factor as given, but it is much more 
complex than the simplistic version I portrayed. The decision-making process is a black box 
here. It might also be one of the missing links in this research.  
             The absence of a model in the existing literature however, points out some holes in 
the theory. For further research, I recommend that these holes are being targeted. There needs 
to be further researched how national role conceptions and leadership styles can act as stimuli 
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for foreign policy change. Also, the variable ‘decision-making process’ needs to be further 
researched in combination with national role conceptions and leadership styles. I also 
recommend that my own model needs to be mended and improved. Furthermore, the trends 
concerning national role conceptions, leadership styles, and foreign policy change would be 
better to understand when multiple cases over a longer time period are researched. If possible, 
I also recommend to make more use of primary sources concerning a leader’s foreign policy 
approach.  
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